Designing inter-plant water networks is aimed to minimise freshwater consumption, wastewater discharge or the total annualised cost in the overall system. In order to achieve the optimal design, it requires the collaboration between process plants in the site to facilitate the operation. This study considers the grand coalition with finite players (process plants), who agreed to take part in the Total Site Water Integration. The confidential data and information about the water qualities in different plants are to be shared among the plants. Each plant may sell their water sources to the other plants via centralised water mains, and the other plants have to pay a certain cost to buy the specific water source. The coordination of the resources has to be fixed in a revenue-sharing or cost-sharing contracts between plants. This work aims to apply the cooperative game theory approach to examine the possible coalitions between the plants and estimate the overall system’s profits. The ultimate goal is to identify the stable and fair profit distribution among the plants for the overall benefits of the system, specifically using the minimax core method.
|Position of speaker||MEng.|
|Affiliation of speaker||Sustainable Process Integration Laboratory – SPIL, NETME Centre, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Brno University of Technology – VUT Brno, Technická 2896/2, 616 69 Brno, Czech Republic|
|Publication||Impact Factor journals|